There has been, historically, a dearth of books in the English language written specifically about the Maginot Line. Many accounts have been written about the German invasion of the Low Countries, in which the Maginot Line has featured as an ancillary part of that story. Kevin Passmore’s professionally researched book fills that void and is to be welcomed for that achievement alone.

In the early chapters, Passmore covers the strategic background and changes in French military doctrine, during and after the First World War, which led to the construction of the fortifications. He then moves onto the construction phase itself, in the lead up to the Second World War, the intrigue, politics and tensions within the French military about defence doctrine and the men that manned the fortifications. In looking at the men who manned the fortifications, Passmore gives a great description of what it was like to live and work in the fortifications. The next few chapters look at the Maginot Line within a civilian context, particularly in the Alsace-Lorraine region, and the interactions between troops manning the forts and the local population, the risks of espionage, particularly from the Communist Party, refugees from Nazi Germany and foreign contractors (Italian and German) working on the construction of the forts. 

Passmore looks at life on the Maginot Line during the Phoney War of autumn 1939 and spring 1940 – in particular the “fight” against demoralisation and complacency of those soldiers manning the forts, and then the events surrounding Case Yellow (the German invasion of the Low Countries) in May 1940. One of the interesting areas covered by the book is what happened to the troops manning the forts after the Allies had been evacuated from Dunkirk and France had capitulated – the ignominy of surrender and being marched off to German POW camps. 

The final chapters deal with the political “fall out” from the Maginot Line’s ineffectiveness to stop the fall of France. Both post-capitulation and post-Second World War, the French equivalent of the “guns facing the wrong way in Singapore” played its part in the much wider debate about why France fell so easily, but there was a steadfast refusal to acknowledge that the Maginot Line itself was in any way responsible for France’s defeat.

This book, illustrated by some well drawn maps, is an excellent account of why the Maginot Line was built, how it was manned, working conditions of those manning it, and the part it played in the fall of France in 1940. One often overlooked fact is that, by forcing the Germans to attack through the Low Countries, the Maginot Line played its part in guaranteeing British intervention in trying to stop German invasion, something that was far from certain at the time of its construction.