On 24 February 2022, President Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in effect a massive escalation of a war he had begun in 2014 as a direct result of Ukraine’s ‘Revolution of Dignity’ which ousted the authoritarian regime of his ally Viktor Yanukovych. Whereas a decade ago this military gamble by Putin’s forces allowed his forces to quickly annex the Crimea and then contest the Donbas Region with tacit support to separatists conducting a bloody proxy war, his major offensive in 2022 to conquer the whole country failed within days of it commencing.
Russian propaganda (and to some degree Western analysts) predicted Putin’s much-vaunted ‘special military operation’ would once again lead to a rapid, bloodless victory, at little cost to the vast array of military assets aligned against the young democracy. But the Ukrainian army surprised the watching world with a highly effective and courageous defence that not only stopped Putin’s offensive in its tracks, but quickly established worldwide support for President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. The conflict would be reminiscent of the Second World War with Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, with the fighting being contested over the same ground around the capital Kiev, but also Sevastopol, Kharkiv, and Mariupol. Twenty-four, rolling news stories by the international press, and smart phone technology by those fighting on the frontline, has all of us watching at home bearing witness to the brutality a civil war always brings to any campaign: twenty-first century technology of explosive drones, laser guided missiles, augmenting trench and urban warfare, artillery duels, and the spectre of cities, towns and villages levelled, and the innocents either massacred, raped or kidnapped. We watched in the first year of conflict as Ukraine was attacked not just by the regular troops of the Russian armed forces, but also by bands of mercenaries and pardoned convicts. It has resulted in tens of thousands dying in combat, the eastern half of Ukraine’s infrastructure destroyed, and a refugee crisis of millions, scenes not not recorded since the end of the Second World War.
This conflict is in our homes every evening – despite it being relegated on the news agenda by the tragic fighting and loss of life in Gaza – is now in its third year of fighting. From this vantage point in time, it allows critical analysis and expert conclusion of what actually happened in the first full year of Putin’s war. Make no mistake – he owns this in its entirety: every building destroyed, every soldier killed on the frontline or executed when captured, and every woman and child killed or made homeless. Putin’s War, Russian Genocide is a remarkable volume of essays that will both educate and inform anyone who wishes to lift the lid on this tragedy and fully realise how it happened and what is at stake for all of us should Putin succeed.
A British historian now living and working in Germany, Doctor Philip W. Blood leads a panel of experts comprised from the legal and military professions, as well as academia. As general editor of this volume of the first year of the war in Ukraine, Blood takes the helm as the team supplies the reader with a collection of essays that seek to not only offer a rebuttal of Putin’s twisted view on Ukrainian history and its relationship to nationhood, but also tackle how those in the west have failed to comprehend his motives, his obsession with the Cold War, and what the strategic consequences will be for NATO and the western democracies as we go forward. These collected works also provide the reader with excellent insight to understand the strategy on the ground and why the Russian juggernaut was stopped in its tracks, the impact of technology on the battlefield, how has genocide once again visited our continent and been allowed to flourish without a tougher legal response, and the existential threat of the region going nuclear. The sabre Putin seems always keen to rattle.
To hear the Russian leader speak on the victory parade at Volgograd (Stalingrad) for the 80th anniversary of the Soviet’s greatest military victory in January 1943, of once again German tanks bearing the black cross on the ancient borders of the Motherland, was chilling. This was a leader confident in his plans, despite the horrific losses and setbacks of the first year’s fighting, and adamant that Ukraine will return to the Russian fold come what may. No matter what assistance Ukraine receives from the west, or the cost to his own forces and people, or whomever is the next POTUS across the Atlantic. His version of Russian imperialism is here to stay. Putin’s War, Russian Genocide provides a snapshot to tell you on how his plans came unstuck in this first pivotal year, but where weaknesses drawn out in this period still reside in the defender’s ability to hold him off. You won’t read a better collection of thoughts and ideas if you want to draw up your own conclusions. This volume will stand the test of time much in the same way as Ken Burn’s iconic series on the American Civil War has done. I rate it that highly.
Edited by Philip W. Blood with contributions by Chris Bellamy, Philipp W. Blood, Dustin Du Cane, Roger Cirillo. Iain MacGregor is a historian and the author of The Lighthouse of Stalingrad: The Hidden Truth at the Centre of WWII’s Greatest Battle.