I have read a good deal about the Kennedys, both generally and in research detail when one of my detective novels featured the family patriarch, Joe, as a character.  Joe Kennedy was not a very nice man, and he passed on some of his less pleasant characteristics to his sons. The personal failings of the most famous and glamorous of the clan, John F Kennedy, are well-known and as a politician he always struck me as overrated. Abyss, the riveting analysis by Max Hastings of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, however, obliges me to reassess. For Kennedy’s cool head and careful judgement in dealing with Russia’s Cuban adventure might well have been the principal factors which saved the planet from destruction.

The central part of the book is a description of the deliberations and decisions during those famous 13 days in October when the risk of nuclear Armageddon through accident or intent seemed perilously high. He leads us into the meat of his story with a concise evaluation of the state of America, Russia and Cuba in the years immediately prior to the crisis. Among the many interesting new things I learned in this preliminary section was that the first manned space flight by Yuri Gagarin was bedevilled with technical problems and very nearly ended in disaster. This is indicative of the fact that Russia was far less technologically advanced than it liked to pretend.

‘I remember thinking the world was going to end any time now’ says one American man, a child in 1962, who is quoted by Hastings. I was 9 years of age in 1962. I remember the crisis but don’t think I registered the full extent of the danger. I do remember though the palpable sense of unease among the adults in my family. The book sets out in fine detail what a close-run thing everything was and provides fascinating portraits of all the key characters. Kennedy and his team spent much of their time trying to second guess what they thought were complex Russian strategic thought processes when it seems in fact that no deep strategic thinking existed. It seems most likely that the impetus for Khruschev’s plan derived from little more than a desire to throw dirt in Kennedy’s face with little thought given to the consequences. Thus when Kennedy, ignoring pressure from the US military to invade Cuba, nevertheless acted firmly by setting up a blockade, Khruschev struggled to find an appropriate response. In the end Kennedy remained resolute in negotiation and the Russians backed down. The behaviour of Kennedy’s military chiefs, with USAF head Curtis LeMay to the fore, was shockingly cavalier and irresponsible. Stanley Kubrick’s classic film Doctor Strangelove seems to have been dangerously close to the truth.

One question prompted by this history is why, at a time when Russia has just launched a full-out war on the continent of Europe, the nuclear dangers don’t seem to be troubling us in the same way as they did in 1962? Is Putin a much less formidable and more reasonable antagonist than Khruschev? On the evidence of this book and current developments I would think not. Why then the more relaxed attitude to the chances of mutual destruction? I’m not sure I know the answer. Meanwhile Abyss is an excellent book and I highly recommend it.

Mark Ellis is a writer and author of Dead in the Water.