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Putin's War Russian Genocide presents a critical exploration of the initial year of Russia's incursion into Ukraine, commencing in February 2022. This remarkable volume brings together a diverse panel of experts, including former soldiers, academics, and legal professionals. Notably, three of ...
How did the Ordinary German Soldier Behave During the War and the Holocaust?In 1997, I unearthed the war diaries of two Luftwaffe security battalions from the years 1942 to 1944. These diaries meticulously chronicled the battalion, company, platoon, and squad level operations, detailing ...
Book Reviews
On 24 February 2022, President Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in effect a massive escalation of a war he had begun in 2014 as a direct result of Ukraine’s ‘Revolution of Dignity’ which ousted the authoritarian regime of his ally Viktor Yanukovych. Whereas a decade ago
Birds of Prey, by Philip W. Blood
The Bialowieźa forest, in Poland and Belarus, is now a UNESCO World Heritage site. The forest is full of interesting plant life and a wide range of wildlife including wolves, wild boar, deer and European bison. No wonder then, that when the Germans invaded the
Author Interviews
Philip W. Blood, many congratulations on this fascinating collection of essays. Why did you want to embark on this project?Thank you. The impetus to write the book originally followed from posting an open access paper on academic websites. The paper postulated that Putin’s strategy reflected an Anaconda Plan. A leading British publisher suggested a book, which unfortunately we could not actualise. Chris Schoen, Ibidem (Stuttgart) advised he could publish the book before year end.The group of authors came from our common experience of working or being supervised by the late Professor Richard Holmes. In addition, Chris Bellamy is an expert of Russo-Soviet military culture and operations. Roger Cirillo served in the US Army, had experience of working in NATO, and is an historian of Cold War military operations and. Dustin Du Cane is a Polish lawyer based in Warsaw but with strong cultural links with Ukraine.The authors collectively decided to focus upon Putin’s first year of war as a serious credible threat to Europe and western security. We followed two themes in the plan – firstly, to ensure the details of the first year were not lost to history; secondly, we wanted to synchronize real-time events to analysis.Your contributors are challenging orthodoxies, with social media a particular target for ire. What has been the problem with social media, and what are the orthodoxies that you believe are unhelpful?Social media is a wonderful creation for mass communication and most people engage on one platform or more. Access to social media has allowed me to engage with several global communities, was influential in shaping this book, and instrumental in the publication of a previous manuscript in 2021.However, social media is overtly influenced by propaganda, politics, and extremism. The platforms function through algorithms that have no ethical limits and no moral compass. In theory, extremes and norms can co-exist, and all content is equalised. In practice, social media is not neutral. Additionally, the owners of platforms cast a powerful influence in the arenas, and they manipulate algorithms for interest groups.Consequently, in the war, both Russian and Ukrainian propagandists have flooded the platforms with content, pushing false narratives and manipulated images. The depiction of the war in social media has become diffused, or overstated, or diminished, as further content rapidly shifts trajectories and quickly alters attitudes.Alarmingly, in the early days of the war, the seemingly professional reporting by ‘experts’ on social media informed public broadcast media. A significant part of this content proved false or fake, and broadcast media began to push back the war from the headlines. Scholars posting hasty opinions, predicting victories, and questioning the truth of the genocide has also cooled the general public’s interest. In an age marked by a deep loss of credibility for experts and politicians alike, the war is being forced to compete for public attention – which largely suits Putin.Collectively soldiers and scholars were caught betwixt n’ between in endorsing content in their engagements on social media about the war. Some have used the platforms to build a personal following to promote themselves and self-monetise the war. Others have become lost in the heady rhetoric that comes with war as a ‘socialising’ process. While yet more have dismissed the discourse and now completely avoid any comment on the war.The authors of the book took different standpoints during the writing of their essays. As editor, I thought it wise to withdraw from public engagement to avoid word salad writing. I continued to monitor Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Academia. Chris Bellamy is fully engaged with broadcast media but shuns social media. Roger Cirillo engages with the regular social forums of American academics and the military, but also shuns social media. Dustin du Cane is a regular surfer across many social media platforms and was the go-to person for the book’s web content.In February 2024 the war will have been raging for two years, where are we now?Confusion continues to define the war ‘s narrative. Arguments in favour of extending support for Ukraine are countered by arguments for removing support and forcing a settlement on Ukraine. Additionally, history teaches how uncertain second and third years of a war can turn. Belligerents dig in for the long haul, while the wastage of national reserves begins to force more aggressive operations leading to more losses. Desperation mounts, as uncertainty increases. Presently, Putin has talked publicly of a settlement, but has never settled for anything less than total victory. He is an unreliable actor in foreign affairs and peace treaties. Putin has frequently frozen conflicts to impose isolation on warzones to wear down foreign interest. We must accept Ukraine is locked in an existential war and has no choice but to continue military operations but is fast losing reserves and impetus. If the west is to retain its sovereignty and security, the west is forced to encourage Ukraine to continue fighting and dying, regardless of the depleted condition of the NATO forces. Long term this situation lacks credibility and viability for everyone except Putin.Chris Bellamy is reminded of September 1916, two years into WW1 and at the tail end of the Battle of the Somme. Massive British and French casualties - substitute Britain and France for Russia. There is still a stalemate. Massive casualties on both sides and minimal gains. New technologies have come in to try to circumvent the land stalemate including Zeppelins, aeroplanes, and submarines. Fast forward 107 years: drones.Many countries in the West have provided military and financial backing to Ukraine in their struggle with Russia, but do you think that backing will endure for another two years, particularly now the Israel/Gaza conflict is attracting attention?In February 2022, against the social media collective, I argued the war would be hard and long.Chris believes it’s debatable and mindful of media focus on Israel/Hamas possibly not. Unless, of course, there is a massive shift of power in Russia.There are enormous internal pressures on western governments to slow down or cut financial support or military aid to Ukraine. Depending upon the outcome of elections in UK and USA, they represent threats to Ukraine’s continuing support. The economic costs of the war in Europe include the mass refugees, which is boiling into an humanitarian crisis, the massive impact on energy costs and supply, and the ongoing shortages in certain foodstuffs.The general public in Europe have continued to express disinterest in the war or its outcome. Those who care for Ukraine are concerned about the prospect of a Trump victory and the prospect of enforced settlement.Ukrainians quite rightly want a return to pre-2014 borders, but is that achievable militarily?History informs that it’s almost impossible to restore old borders after an extreme conflict and where the violence has turned genocidal. In discussions with authors the consensus has been that Ukraine ‘s frontiers are no longer sovereign and that undermines the national will to continue the war.The Russians don't like losing. Overall, probably not. Unless, like November 1918, the Russians rise against their leadership. The best solution, assuming that does not happen, is probably to strive for a ceasefire and negotiations for a solution that might be ( the Bellamy peace plan) that would let Russia keep Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk. Ukraine would keep the rest but with a Demilitarized Zone on the right bank (S and W) of the Dnipro and maybe along the Belarusian border.In two years, the Russians have lost more than 100,000 troops killed (this is an estimate), as opposed to approx. 15,000 in the ten-year Soviet-Afghan conflict. As we know the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, so will it be longevity or losses, or neither or both, that could see a Russian retreat?Compared with Afghanistan, Russian casualties are indeed staggering. Important to differentiate between recoverable (wounded) and irrecoverable (dead, prisoners, missing) losses. In Afghanistan the soldatskiye materi (soldiers' mums) movement was important. But wider liberalisation and imminent dissolution in USSR also played a role. Plus ca change?Russian losses have been a cause of speculation since the war started. The national demographics have been in a downward trajectory since the 1980s. In this regard, Russia needs a pacified Ukrainian population to restore its domestic population. It also needs to acquire lands and peoples to counter its declining birthdate. That renders predicting Putin's war aims extremely difficult because they can shift or pivot as his strategic paradigms change. Even if Russia was forced into a defeat, it won’t remove the eternal threat of a superpower in a constant birth-rate meltdown.There are both academics and veterans contributing to your collection – is there a consensus on what Ukraine’s strategy for 2024 should be?The ‘veterans’ among us have been concerned about the longevity of the war-fighting future of Ukraine. The reports from the visits to Ukraine by the lawyer in the team have focused upon the precarious situation in Ukraine ‘s rear areas. The veterans talk about mass, even in regard to Russia's losses. The losses push greater sacrifices. Having surveyed a number of friends and colleagues serving in European defence academies, there is a general opinion that Russia retains the strategic initiative. Most also argue that Ukraine is shifting from an operational to a strategic war stance, giving it a greater opportunity to inflict serious defeats on Russia at a relatively cheap cost in material and personnel. It’s a difficult decision and high-risk foray opponent to shift stance while locked in a fight. Perhaps, Ukraine has finally begun to learn to win, and Russia has become temporarily spooked by the horrifying spectre of looming defeat.Most powerfully the book addresses the genocide inflicted on Ukraine by Russia. Is this driven by historical animosities or de-humanising of the Ukrainian people by Russian elites?We, the authors, eventually reached a consensus. Chris thought, that, whereas a concatenation of multiple and individual war crimes did not in itself amount to genocide, genocide is a deliberate, over-arching attempt to erase a people/race/nation from history. This appears to be Putin's aim. Among all the atrocities and crimes against humanity the deportation of Ukrainian kids to be brought up as good little Russians is, perhaps counterintuitively, what tips the verdict from war crimes and crimes against humanity to full-blown genocide.The problem people face, in regard to genocide, is its meaning. Contemporary genocide is a lot more sophisticated, as a political weapon, as perpetrators have learned best to practice for maximum effectiveness. The methods wielded by the Nazis or the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia were clumsy and cost too many resources. Putin pointed the artillery at the cities and pounded the civilians. That caused the internal refugee problem on Ukraine’s interior lines and drove the fear factor that the ‘barbarians’ are coming.Trashing the national identity of the ‘other’ has been a peculiarly Russian trait of political violence. The old Red Army could be made to commit sexual violence or atrocities at the switch of Stalin’s button. The Russian army positioning artillery forces to de-house masses of population, depopulating cities, represented exploiting collateral damage for Putin’s political ends.Putin is a KGB officer; his MO is terror biased. Defeating the enemy with terror, recalling the Red Army’s history, or unleashing his troops to commit atrocities are his MO. But Putin is not a Stalin. His inner circle has no ideology, he holds court like a mafia boss. His repeated failures and failings would have led him to the Lubyanka in Stalin’s day. He’s a serial failure but the bloodshed and destruction are giving him the identity of an untouchable dictator. Either he will be assassinated or will pass with age, the greater problem for the world is the eventual successor.
Philip Blood is a historian and editor of the Putin's War, Russian Genocide: Essays about the First Year of the War in Ukraine.
Philip Blood is a historian and editor of the Putin's War, Russian Genocide: Essays about the First Year of the War in Ukraine.Philip W. Blood, what first attracted you to the period or periods you work in?My fascination with twentieth-century warfare was ignited by several memorable moments in childhood. My father, an aircraft design engineer with Avro, introduced me to the fascinating world of military aviation by attending air shows. However, it wasn't until my great grandfather's hundredth birthday that I realized the full extent of the family’s history of service in both World Wars. In 1968, I met Field Marshal Montgomery and later that year, Noble Frankland, director of the Imperial War Museum, further fuelling my interest. A year later I attended the premier of the film Battle of Britain (a picture of my programme) when several fighter aces were present. During a Summer holiday in 1970, I met a party of Afrika Korps veterans, and they talked about the Desert War. Returning home, my father gifted me with Shirer’s The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich and Höhne’s The Order of the Death’s Head, constant companions that reinforced my growing fascination. Even during my A’ levels, I paid my respects at Montgomery’s funeral in Windsor, standing alongside Afrika Korps and Desert Rat veterans who honoured his memory.
In 1978 I went to university with the intention of studying history and was taught war studies by Professor John Gooch. During this time, I discovered an interest for civil-military relations, strategic studies and genocide taught by the late Professor Martin Edmonds who arranged for me to join the Royal United Services Institute in 1981. I also attended electives in Soviet and Eastern European history and during my gap year spent an extended period in East Germany (DDR) and Poland. It was during these visits that I began to take a particular interest in military occupation and security.After wrapping up my career in the City of London, I transitioned into part-time teaching and guiding historical tours across Europe and America. It was during the 90s that I had the privilege of meeting Henry Metelmann, a German army veteran, whose insights into studying the ordinary soldier left a lasting impact. In 1996, I delved into historical research, laying the groundwork for what would become my passion. The following year, I approached the late Professor Richard Holmes with a proposal for a PhD project. With Richard and Chris Bellamy as my supervisors, I embarked on a thesis examining Bandenbekämpfung (bandit-hunting) and the concept of security warfare, culminating in the award of a doctorate. In 1999, I made the move to Germany, initially for work in academia, but eventually settling to immerse myself in German and European history. My journey culminated in the publication of my first book in 2006, marking a significant milestone in a path that began in the 60s.Can you tell us a little about how you research? Has the process changed over the years?My approach to research was heavily influenced by my tenure assessing and investigating insurance claims for Lloyds of London. The skills were honed toward reconstructing evidence from incomplete records to discern the 'train of events' of a claim proved invaluable. It was under the guidance of Richard Holmes that I refined these techniques, incorporating tweaks to enhance my research methodology, such as rigorous validation of documents before their inclusion in analyses.A pivotal evolution in my research methodology came with the incorporation of Geographical Information System (GIS) mapping. This revolutionary tool allowed for a granular examination of soldiers in combat, by meticulously reprofiling military reports and mapping multiple troop movements, synchronizing them to specific actions. This scientific approach serves as a potent tool for advanced research across various projects, facilitating rapid assessment of ordinary soldiers' intent and purpose. Moreover, it significantly diminishes uncertainty in war crimes cases, bolstering the integrity of investigations.The common phrase is that history is written by the victors. Do you think this is true?Nations write their own histories, whether they win or lose. Sometimes scholars have been able to shape foreign opinions through conference and translations of publications. Cultures have different interpretations of history, for example British military history still retains the classical ‘drum and musket’ tales, whereas in Germany social-military history often synthesises cultural anthropology. Lately, European scholars have expressed growing concern over the impact of social media, and the narrowing of history by political nostalgia and national exceptionalism.Are there any historians who helped shape your career? Similarly, can you recommend three history books which budding historians should read? During my first university, the works of Sir John Keegan and Sir Michael Howard were fundamental to our studies. Before embarking on my PhD, I was profoundly influenced by the writings and lectures of the late Eric Hobsbawm, particularly in shaping my understanding of social history.Collaborating with Richard Holmes and Chris Bellamy proved to be a transformative experience. They eschewed formal titles like 'military historian,' instead fostering an environment of student empowerment and input. Richard's emphasis on writing skills, critical analysis, and historical interpretation was unparalleled. His meticulous academic planning set the stage for intensive writing and structural refinement throughout my studies. Meanwhile, deciphering Chris's notes, written in Russian shorthand, added an extra layer of challenging fun.While their methods may have seemed rigorous at first, the gradual transformation and burgeoning self-confidence were palpable. Following the publication of my first book, Richard became a dear friend and graciously penned the foreword. Our discussions ranged from his military tour in Iraq to his acclaimed work Dusty Warriors (2007), which remains a personal favourite of mine. In a testament to our collaboration, Chris co-authored Putin’s War: Russian Genocide (2023), underscoring the enduring impact of our working relationship alongside Richard.A recommendation for three books that I have worked with, not easy since there have been so many – (1) something from earlier research, (2) something from present research, and (3) something fun:
Perhaps a conversation with Percy Wyndham (picture attached). An Englishman of dubious record, he trained as an Austrian cavalry officer in the 1850s, fought with distinction for Garibaldi against the Austrians, and later became a cavalry commander in the Union Army during the American Civil War.I would choose to witness the US Army’s occupation of Mexico 1846-8, as experienced from the Mexican standpoint.If you could add any period or subject to the history curriculum, what would it be?A general course of British political history, from feudalism to democracy. Perhaps it might grant young persons a better appreciation of the importance of voting participation and the collective value of democracy.If you could give a piece of advice to your younger self, either as a student or when you first started out as a writer, what would it be?Enjoy history, find a supervisor who encourages and pushes, and don’t fear writing.Can you tell us a little bit about the project you are currently working on?I have two new projects set to begin in September 2024. One is a discourse about the influence of history on western politics. The second involves a return to Białowieża Forest (in Poland) the setting for my second book Birds of Prey in 2021. This time the research focuses upon Imperial Germany’s occupation of Poland during the Great War.Philip Blood is a historian and editor of the Putin's War, Russian Genocide: Essays about the First Year of the War in Ukraine.
In 1978 I went to university with the intention of studying history and was taught war studies by Professor John Gooch. During this time, I discovered an interest for civil-military relations, strategic studies and genocide taught by the late Professor Martin Edmonds who arranged for me to join the Royal United Services Institute in 1981. I also attended electives in Soviet and Eastern European history and during my gap year spent an extended period in East Germany (DDR) and Poland. It was during these visits that I began to take a particular interest in military occupation and security.After wrapping up my career in the City of London, I transitioned into part-time teaching and guiding historical tours across Europe and America. It was during the 90s that I had the privilege of meeting Henry Metelmann, a German army veteran, whose insights into studying the ordinary soldier left a lasting impact. In 1996, I delved into historical research, laying the groundwork for what would become my passion. The following year, I approached the late Professor Richard Holmes with a proposal for a PhD project. With Richard and Chris Bellamy as my supervisors, I embarked on a thesis examining Bandenbekämpfung (bandit-hunting) and the concept of security warfare, culminating in the award of a doctorate. In 1999, I made the move to Germany, initially for work in academia, but eventually settling to immerse myself in German and European history. My journey culminated in the publication of my first book in 2006, marking a significant milestone in a path that began in the 60s.Can you tell us a little about how you research? Has the process changed over the years?My approach to research was heavily influenced by my tenure assessing and investigating insurance claims for Lloyds of London. The skills were honed toward reconstructing evidence from incomplete records to discern the 'train of events' of a claim proved invaluable. It was under the guidance of Richard Holmes that I refined these techniques, incorporating tweaks to enhance my research methodology, such as rigorous validation of documents before their inclusion in analyses.A pivotal evolution in my research methodology came with the incorporation of Geographical Information System (GIS) mapping. This revolutionary tool allowed for a granular examination of soldiers in combat, by meticulously reprofiling military reports and mapping multiple troop movements, synchronizing them to specific actions. This scientific approach serves as a potent tool for advanced research across various projects, facilitating rapid assessment of ordinary soldiers' intent and purpose. Moreover, it significantly diminishes uncertainty in war crimes cases, bolstering the integrity of investigations.The common phrase is that history is written by the victors. Do you think this is true?Nations write their own histories, whether they win or lose. Sometimes scholars have been able to shape foreign opinions through conference and translations of publications. Cultures have different interpretations of history, for example British military history still retains the classical ‘drum and musket’ tales, whereas in Germany social-military history often synthesises cultural anthropology. Lately, European scholars have expressed growing concern over the impact of social media, and the narrowing of history by political nostalgia and national exceptionalism.Are there any historians who helped shape your career? Similarly, can you recommend three history books which budding historians should read? During my first university, the works of Sir John Keegan and Sir Michael Howard were fundamental to our studies. Before embarking on my PhD, I was profoundly influenced by the writings and lectures of the late Eric Hobsbawm, particularly in shaping my understanding of social history.Collaborating with Richard Holmes and Chris Bellamy proved to be a transformative experience. They eschewed formal titles like 'military historian,' instead fostering an environment of student empowerment and input. Richard's emphasis on writing skills, critical analysis, and historical interpretation was unparalleled. His meticulous academic planning set the stage for intensive writing and structural refinement throughout my studies. Meanwhile, deciphering Chris's notes, written in Russian shorthand, added an extra layer of challenging fun.While their methods may have seemed rigorous at first, the gradual transformation and burgeoning self-confidence were palpable. Following the publication of my first book, Richard became a dear friend and graciously penned the foreword. Our discussions ranged from his military tour in Iraq to his acclaimed work Dusty Warriors (2007), which remains a personal favourite of mine. In a testament to our collaboration, Chris co-authored Putin’s War: Russian Genocide (2023), underscoring the enduring impact of our working relationship alongside Richard.A recommendation for three books that I have worked with, not easy since there have been so many – (1) something from earlier research, (2) something from present research, and (3) something fun:- Richard Holmes, Firing Line, (1985).
- Gerhard P. Gross, Die Vergessene Front. Der Osten 1914/15, (2006).
- Sellar and Yeatman, 1066 and All That, (193).
Percy Wyndham
Philip Blood is a historian and editor of the Putin's War, Russian Genocide: Essays about the First Year of the War in Ukraine.Philip W. Blood, Birds of Prey is an extraordinary piece of work using groundbreaking research to produce an original book on the Second World War. Not an easy feat. Was this a story you discovered, or one you always wanted to tell?The book is both a narrative I was compelled to share and a journey of discovery. It originated from my PhD research. In 1997, I unearthed a small collection of Luftwaffe documents from the military archive in Freiburg, Germany. These were diaries, combat reports, and muster rolls, all carefully laminated for long-term preservation. The archivists had no record of why these documents survived the war. My supervisor, Professor Richard Holmes, encouraged me to include some of this content in my PhD thesis and to expand it into a comprehensive book. The background investigation and evidence gathering took much longer than anticipated, but the result is this detailed account.The Bialowieźa Forest in eastern Poland is where you write about. What was its significance during WW2?German involvement with the Białowieża Forest is a long and complex saga. For centuries, this royal forest was a jewel of the Polish monarchy. After the third partition of Poland, New East Prussia annexed the forest from 1795 to 1807. Following the Treaty of Tilsit, it was ceded to the Imperial Russian Empire. German expertise in forestry and hunting was introduced through the employment of professional gamekeepers, primarily to protect the forest's prized European bison. During the Great War, German occupation led to overhunting and severe depletion of the game population. The forest itself was heavily logged to supply wood for the Hindenburg Line on the Western Front. In the interwar period, the forest became a battleground during the Soviet-Polish War.In the 1930s, Nazi fascination with the myths of Germania's giant forests grew. At a Berlin hunting exhibition, Białowieża was showcased as the pride of Poland and Europe. Although Hermann Göring was deeply interested in the politics of the forest, his hunt-master noted he only hunted there once, in the winter of 1938, due to his morbid fear of snakes. In 1939, a German Panzer Division briefly occupied the forest before it was handed over to the Soviet Union. The Germans returned in June 1941, and by August, they had "cleansed" the forest of Jews and Russians. Göring then arranged for thenWhat part does Herman Göring play in your book?In the eighty years since the war, Göring has increasingly been ridiculed in war history and marginalized in Holocaust accounts. While in power, Göring was ruthless, virulently antisemitic, devious, and fiercely loyal to Hitler. Their unbreakable bond, forged long before they seized power, nearly realized their mutual goals. These goals were often contradictory, fuelling rumours and myths that painted Göring as a comedic figure.In Birds of Prey, Göring’s pivotal role within the Nazi regime is examined on multiple levels. His geopolitical mission focused on nation-building—redefining Germany’s borders and advancing Grossdeutschland. This ambition is often mistakenly conflated with Hitler’s Lebensraum and Nazi colonial ambitions in the east. Grossdeutschland partly motivated the annexation of the Białowieża Forest, which in turn exposed Göring’s virulent antisemitism.Before the war, Göring's antisemitism was evident in his extreme slogans against Jews. After Kristallnacht in 1938, he likened Jews to ugly beasts of the forest. His letter to SS leadership on July 31, 1941, ordering a “final solution to the Jewish question,” initiated policies leading to mass extermination camps. Within hours, Göring’s senior foresters instructed the SS to execute all male Jews in Białowieża aged 16 to 60, carried out on August 5.Göring was instrumental in the rise of the Luftwaffe, the Nazification of forestry and hunting, and introducing the Gestapo. He participated in the removal of anti-Nazi resistance, including the extermination of the SA leadership in 1934. After Röhm’s removal, supposedly for wanting to build a Nazi Wehrmacht, Göring planned for the Luftwaffe to replace the Wehrmacht and the Army, a plan already underway before the war.In Birds of Prey, Göring’s military leadership is closely examined. Like Hitler and many Nazi leaders, Göring relied on advice before making decisions. He used the Luftwaffe’s military system to assess situations and make recommendations, often negotiating outcomes agreed upon by all parties. He was not above erasing records and, in one negotiation, offered a promotion to a battalion commander if he reduced the number of Jews killed to an acceptable ‘collateral’ figure.Göring established political etiquette for the organizations under his control. Analysing this etiquette reveals an alternative understanding of how class, professionalism, and status functioned within key sectors of the Third Reich. For example, Luftwaffe flyers adopting hunting language highlighted their social and honour codes. This understanding of political rituals within emerging Nazi culture shows how some elements have outlasted the regime. In September 1942, Göring sacrificed two royal stags to Nazi rituals the same week he committed the Luftwaffe to the Stalingrad campaign, agreed to clear ghettos and deport Jews to extermination facilities, received reports from Dachau medical experiments, and ordered a security battalion to Białowieża Forest to hunt Jews escaping into the woods.The Luftwaffe are often presented as an example of ‘Good Germans,’ a branch of the military that did not participate in war crimes. However, *Birds of Prey* reveals this is not the case. The Luftwaffe committed war crimes long before World War II. Göring’s regiment conducted crimes against Communists and Socialists before 1936. After they were absorbed into the Luftwaffe, they became the cadre for the Hermann Göring Panzer Division, which consistently committed crimes against allied POWs and engaged in art theft across occupied Europe. The Fallschirmjäger, paratroopers, committed heinous crimes in Holland, Crete, Italy, and France. The Luftwaffe’s close air support missions often targeted villages and civilians in Spain, Soviet Russia, Yugoslavia, and Greece, framing them as resistance or partisans. In this context, it is unsurprising that Luftwaffe troops killed civilians in Białowieża Forest. The surprise was that ordinary soldiers perpetrated extreme acts of violence without officers ordering them to kill civilians.What role did hunting, and the state forestry organisation play in genocide?Forestry was both a myth and a reality in the Third Reich. The myth originated from the idea of ‘Germania’ in an ancient Roman poem and the romanticization of Germanic tribes. Göring used these cultural ideas to shape his vision of Germany, a confused mix of cultural, industrial, military, environmental, and social order elements. This vision was riddled with contradictions, such as the clash between industrialization and environmentalism. Militarily, Göring saw forest wilderness bastions on the eastern frontier as defensive barriers central to Nazi national security, presumably policed from above by the Luftwaffe. Forestry was a strategic centrepiece of the Nazi drive toward economic self-sufficiency. Göring convinced Hitler that forests could become the heart of a synthetic economy, supplying fuel, clothing, and food. This dichotomy of myth and reality emerged in Białowieża Forest, where part of the forest was exploited for logging while wilderness areas were expanded.Hunting was implicated in acts of Holocaust violence during the Nuremberg trials. Evidence showed that Erich Koch, the Nazi boss of East Prussia and nominal owner of Białowieża Forest, exploited Jewish labour to build his hunting estates. While evidence was presented, there was no specific trial. In *Hitler’s Furies*, Wendy Lower describes how a Nazi boss’s secretary went on a drunken hunt in Poland with Jews as the game. It is notable that Göring’s godfather, a Jewish man, taught him to hunt and was heir to Mauterndorf Castle. However, this Jewish legacy had no restraint on Göring's behaviour. Early in the regime, both forestry and hunting excluded Jews and imposed Aryanization on hunting estates, weapons, and businesses. In Białowieża Forest, Jews trespassing into the forest faced the death penalty.Do we know how many victims of the Nazis were killed in the forest?Unfortunately, we might never know the final total of victims. There are three sets of accounting. The first battalion had a list that did not include many victims handed over to the SS for execution. A second set of figures reduced the number of Jews from the first draft, reclassifying them as collateral damage. This was because Białowieża Forest was legally under German civilian law, making Luftwaffe troops liable for the "murder" of civilians as a civil crime, as defined in their military pay books.The second battalion did not keep a tally of the killings but rewarded soldiers who killed Jews or partisans with marksmanship or for using their initiative. I suspect the numbers were higher but not recorded since there had been difficulties in the first reporting. From an overall estimation based upon those who were shot, deported to ghettoes and transported to Treblinka extermination camp it’s possible to identify about 1,500 Jews from the local communities and persons who fled to the forest to escape the killing actions.What role did GIS play in your research, and why was it significant?Initially, GPS failed in the forest due to the dense canopy and remote location, making it useless in some areas. In 2008, the initial research relied on maps and compasses. Subsequent visits saw gradual improvements in communications, but some areas remained isolated even today.Geographical Information Systems (GIS) enabled the mapping of vast digital data into layers of information on digital maps for inferential analyses. We utilized the research data to formulate different levels of activity. The first analysis aimed to explain how a 600-man battalion could police 166,000 hectares, an area larger than the Shenandoah Valley. The second layer involved determining the patrol cycles of companies, squad patrol limits, and the length/distance of hunting expeditions. The third level identified killing areas and the sites of bunkers used by Jews and partisans to hide out. A fourth level explained how battalions formed up for large-scale operations and to confront the Soviet advance in 1944. Finally, the last level involved walking in step with German soldiers during hunting actions.What are you working on at the moment?I have two new projects set to begin in September 2024. One is a discourse about the influence of history on western politics. The second involves a return to Białowieża Forest (in Poland) the setting for my second book Birds of Prey in 2021. This time the research focuses upon Imperial Germany’s occupation of Poland during the Great War.
Philip W. Blood is a historian and the author of Birds of Prey: Luftwaffe, Ordinary Soldiers, and the Holocaust in Poland published by Ibidem.
Philip W. Blood is a historian and the author of Birds of Prey: Luftwaffe, Ordinary Soldiers, and the Holocaust in Poland published by Ibidem.